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ABSTRACT 
Anti-malware vendors receive several thousand new malware 
(malicious software) variants per day. Due to large volume of 
malware samples, it has become extremely important to group 
them based on their malicious characteristics. Grouping of 
malware variants that exhibit similar behavior helps to generate 
malware signatures more efficiently. Unfortunately, exponential 
growth of new malware variants and huge-dimensional feature 
space, as used in existing approaches, make the clustering task 
very challenging and difficult to scale. Furthermore, malware 
behavior modeling techniques proposed in the literature do not 
scale well, where malware feature space grows in proportion with 
the number of samples under examination.  
In this paper, we propose a scalable malware behavior modeling 
technique that models the interactions between malware and 
sensitive system resources in a coarse-grained manner. Coarse-
grained behavior modeling enables us to generate malware feature 
space that does not grow in proportion with the number of 
samples under examination. A preliminary study shows that our 
approach generates 289 times less malware features and yet 
improves the average clustering accuracy by 6.20% in comparison 
to a state-of-the-art malware clustering technique.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.8 [Operating System]: Security and Protection 
General Terms 
Security, Malware clustering, Malware behavior modeling  
Keywords 
Malware clustering, Coarse-grained behavior modeling 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite the common use and widespread availability of various 
anti-virus tools, the growth of malware is phenomenal.  According 
to Symantec, an anti-virus vendor, more than 286,000,000 new 
malware variants were detected in 2010 [2]. If we further zoom-
in, on average around 55,000 new malware samples were reported 
per day during September, 2011 [4]. Identification of malware 
variants significantly improves the signature detection and 
reduces the size of malware signature database. Thus, it has 
become crucial for anti-virus vendors to analyze and cluster 
malware samples based on their malicious behavior. Manual 
inspection and clustering of malware samples are out of question 
due to their dramatic growth in the recent past [2, 4]. Therefore, it 
has to be automated [3, 4]. 
Malware clustering has been studied by several researchers in the 
past [5, 6, 7, 8]. Malware behavior modeling techniques, proposed 
in the literature, generally use n-gram analysis, non-transient state 
changes, system call trace analysis, taint analysis, system call 
dependency graphs and control flow graphs to extract malicious 
features. Given the number of new malware variants reported per 
day, “scalability” is a major problem in existing feature extraction 
techniques, where malware feature space grows in proportion with 
the number of samples under examination. This makes malware 
clustering a challenging task. 
In this paper, we introduce a simple, yet efficient coarse-grained 
malware behavior modeling technique that captures the 
interactions between malware and sensitive system resources at a 
higher level of abstraction. Coarse-grained behavior modeling 
increases the applicability of our approach across all malware 
classes and importantly, enables us to generate malware feature 
space that does not grows in proportion with the number of 
samples under examination. Higher level of abstraction (i.e. 
agnostic to underlying low-level instructions) improves the 
robustness of our approach against basic obfuscation techniques 
[9]. Furthermore, abstracting away the malware and system 
specific details allows us to reduce large amount of noise (i.e. 
features with low information gain) in the feature space. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our coarse-
grained malware behavior modeling. Section 3 explains the 
scalability of clustering technique. Section 4 discusses our 
experiment results. Section 5 summarizes the related work. 
Finally, we conclude with Section 6. 
2. COARSE-GRAINED BEHAVIOR 
MODELING 
Our study of malware found that File, Registry, Process and 
Network are the most security-critical system resources that are 
widely attacked by malware. Hence, the proposed coarse-grained 
behavior modeling approach focuses on these four security-
critical system resources. The modeling approach can be extended 
to cover more system resources if needed, Furthermore, our 
hypothesis is that for the identification of malware family, one 
need to analyze the types of security-sensitive actions it performs 
on these system resources. It is insignificant to analyze the 
number of times or the sequence these actions are performed as 
malware authors often use some basic obfuscation techniques to 
evade malware detection techniques [5]. Next, we shall describe 
our behavior modeling approach. 
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For file resources, we have identified five possible actions – 
{create, modify, read, delete, memory_mapped} – that could be 
performed by a malware. We only considered those actions that 
are closely related to system security. The tasks performed by 
these actions are self explanatory; create action creates a new 
file/directory or opens an existing file, modify action modifies the 
file in concern, read action reads the content of the file, 
memory_mapped action maps the file into a virtual memory that 
can be shared by several processes and finally delete action 
deletes the file/directory. Hence, a malware has a maximum of (25 
– 1) = 31 possible sets of actions that could be performed on file 
resource. Each such possible set is modeled as a File feature of a 
malware. Therefore, altogether there are 31 possible file features 
of a malware.  
For example, if a malware performs create, modify, and delete 
actions on a file A, then the malware has a file feature    = 
{create, modify, delete}. If the same malware performs create, 
modify, read and deletes actions on another file B, then it has 
another file feature    = {create, modify, read, delete}. However, 
if the same malware performs create, modify, and delete actions 
on a file C, then these actions on C, does not introduce any new 
feature to this malware as this feature is considered the same as 
file feature   . Therefore, this malware has only two file features 
          . As a result of abstraction, an identical set of actions 
performed on two different file objects (e.g. file A and C) are 
considered as a single malware feature. Our initial experiment that 
will be discussed later shows that such behavior modeling reduces 
the amount of noise in the malware features space while 
accurately capturing the underlying malicious characteristics.  
Likewise, we have identified six possible actions – {create_key, 
delete_key, monitor_key, modify_value, read_value, delete_value} 
– that could be performed by a malware on registry resource. 
Registry actions are responsible for critical system behaviors such 
as startup procedures, internet settings and user-specific settings. 
Create_key action creates a new registry key or opens an existing 
one, delete_key action deletes the key from the registry, 
monitor_key action monitors for changes to any attributes or 
contents of a specified registry key, modify_value action creates or 
replaces a registry key’s value, read_value action reads the value 
entry for a key and delete_value action deletes the value entry of a 
specified registry. Similar to file resource, a malware has a 
maximum of (26 -1) = 63 possible sets of actions that could be 
performed on a registry resource.  Each such possible set is 
modeled as a Registry feature of a malware. Therefore, 
altogether there are 63 possible registry features of a malware. 
For the process resource we have listed five possible actions – 
{create_process, delete_process, create_thread, foreign_memory 
_read, foreign_memory_write} – that could be performed by a 
malware. A process is an executing program and one or more 
threads can run in the context of a process. Create_process action 
creates a process to execute a program, delete_process action 
terminates the process and kill all its threads, create_thread action  
creates a new thread to run within an executing process, 
foreign_memory_read action allows the process to read the shared 
memory  and foreign_memory_write action allows the process to 
write to the shared memory. Hence, a malware has a maximum of 
(25 -1) = 31 possible sets of actions that could be performed on a 
process resource.  Each such possible set is modeled as a Process 
feature of a malware. Therefore, altogether there are 31 possible 
process features of a malware. 
Finally, we have identified four possible actions – {address_scan, 
ping, connection_attempt, conversation} – that could be 
performed by a malware during networ k I/O. Address_scan 
action scans for a given network, ping action checks whether a 
remote target available over the network, connection_attempt 
action attempts to connect to a particular destination over the 
network and conversation action communicates with the 
destination. Similar to other system recourses, a malware has a 
maximum of (24 -1) = 15 possible sets of actions that could be 
performed during network I/O.  Each such possible set is modeled 
as a Network feature of a malware. Therefore, altogether there 
are 15 possible network features of a malware. 
From the description of our behavior modeling, it is understood 
that malware feature space is no longer a function of total number 
of malware samples under examination. Furthermore, upper 
bound for the malware feature space is predetermined before 
running the experiment and importantly, it doesn’t depend on the 
number of malware samples under analysis. Thus, our approach 
enhances the scalability of malware clustering. 
2.1 Feature Encoding 
Once the features are extracted from the malware samples, we use 
bit vector to represent them. In total, there can be a maximum of 
31 + 63 + 31 + 15 = 140 features on all four system resources.  
Hence, we use a bit vector of size 140 to represent the malware 
features. The first 31 bits are used to represent the file features 
next 63 bits are used to represent the registry features another 31 
bits are used to represent the process features and the last 15 bits 
are used to represent the network features.  
Formally, let F, R, P, and N be the set of file features, registry 
features, process features and network features respectively. Let 
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         to assign a file, registry, process and network features 
respectively to a positive integer in the respective range that 
serves as the bit position in the feature vector to represent the 
feature. For a malware m, the feature vector V is defined as 
follows; 
     
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
                                                          
                                                        
                                                       
                                                                                                                
  
The similarity between two malware feature vectors is calculated 
using Euclidian distance d. For example, the similarity between 
feature vectors    and    is calculated as;  
                   
 
 
Where,       are normalized feature vectors of vectors    and    
respectively. Due to normalization,            for identical 
behavior and              for completely different behavior. 
2.2 Feature extraction from behavioral 
reports 
Malware samples are executed in Anubis [1], a dynamic malware 
analysis environment, and the generated malware behavioral 
reports are used for our analysis purposes. These behavioral 
reports give a high-level understanding of malware behavior. 
From the behavioral reports, malware features are extracted in two 
steps as explained below. 
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Step 1 - extraction: System resources and the actions performed 
on those resources are extracted as <resource_object_id: 
set_of_actions> pairs, where resource_object_id represents the 
name of system resource object and the set_of_actions represent 
the set of actions performed by malware on the resource object.  
Step 2 - abstraction:  We abstract away the system specific 
details, that is; replace individual system resource object name 
(e.g. a.txt, b.txt, etc…) with the resource type; File, Registry, 
Process and Network. Finally, remove the duplicate features from 
the abstracted feature set.  
 
Listing 1: Sample malware behavioral report 
 
Listing 2: Result of step 1 
 
Listing 3: Result of step 2 
A sample malware behavioral report, with only file activities, is 
shown in Listing 1, while output of step 1 and 2 are shown in 
Listings 2 and 3 respectively. Listing 2 shows the File features 
extracted in step 1 from malware behavioral report. It can be seen 
that the actions performed, by the malware, on file resource 
objects b.txt and c.txt are identical. Thus, in step 2 we remove 
these duplicate features. Listing 3 shows the final set of File 
features that are used to generate malware feature vector as 
explained in section 2.1.  
2.3 Feature pruning 
Once the malware features are extracted, we prune the features 
with low information gain. A feature that appears in only one 
sample (i.e. unique feature) doesn’t help to find other samples that 
behave similarly [5] and common features that appear in most (or 
all) of the malware samples may lead to group two samples 
together even if they both actually belong to two different 
malware classes. Following the approach in [5], we prune those 
features that appear in only one malware and features that appear 
in 90% (or more) of the malware samples.    
3. SCALABLE CLUSTERING  
Apart from scalable behavior modeling, clustering algorithm itself 
has to be scalable in order to cluster large volume of malware 
samples. For large-scale clustering there are two major techniques 
proposed in the literature; (1) Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) 
based clustering used by Bayer et al. [5] and, (2) prototype based 
clustering technique introduced by Rieck et al. [6]. 
Prototype based clustering technique is simple, yet effective for 
malware clustering. From a set of malware samples, prototypes 
are selected based on a threshold value to represent the entire 
malware samples. These selected prototypes are then clustered 
using hierarchical clustering and finally, un-clustered malware 
samples are assigned to the closest prototype (refer to the original 
paper [6] for actual implementation).  Since our focus, in this 
paper, is not on scalable clustering algorithms, we adopt the 
prototype based clustering technique to evaluate the performance 
and applicability of our behavior modeling approach to real-world 
malware clustering problems. It is also noted that we use F-
Measure, introduced by Van Rijsbergen [10], to evaluate the 
clustering accuracy. 
4. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTAL 
RESULTS 
In this section, we discuss our preliminary experimental results to 
evaluate the accuracy and scalability of our coarse-grained 
malware behavior modeling approach. The experiment was 
carried out on a dataset provided by Bayer et al. [5]. Initially we 
had 2658 malware behavioral reports out of which 6 reports were 
discarded due to problems in file parsing. Hence, we carried out 
the experiment using 2652 malware samples. Based on these 2652 
samples, we compare our clustering accuracy against a state-of-
the-art malware clustering technique proposed by Bayer et al. [5] 
and the results obtained by Malheur [6]. Malheur is a tool 
developed by Rieck et al. [6] to automatically analyze the 
malware behavior. It is also noted that we use Malheur in “text” 
mode, where it supports both “text” for textual and XML reports, 
and “MIST” for reports using malware instruction set (refer to [6] 
for more details). 
Bailey et al. [7] pointed out that malware labels given by anti-
virus products suffer from inconsistency and their labels are 
frequently incorrect. Thus, we have decided to evaluate the 
clustering accuracy using malware labels given by five different 
anti-virus products. This enables us to evaluate the robustness of 
our malware clustering technique across five different 
benchmarks and therefore reduces the biasness.  The anti-virus 
products include F-Secure, Ikarus, Symantec, Kaspersky and 
VirusBuster and the corresponding malware labels are obtained 
from Virustotal tool [3]. In this experiment, we only use malware 
family name and the variant name is ignored. For example, we 
group both Worm.Allaple.A and Worm.Allaple.B together and call 
it Allapale malware family.  
The experiment results are shown in Table 1. In terms of 
clustering accuracy, from the experiment results it can be seen 
that our approach clearly outperformed Bayer et al. and Malheur. 
Using Bayer’s results as base we measured the average 
improvement to clustering accuracy. Our approach improved the 
clustering accuracy by 6.20% whereas Malheur improved it by 
only 1.90%.It is also evident that our approach consistently 
performed well against all five benchmarks. 
In terms of scalability, we analyzed the relationship between 
malware feature space and the number of samples under 
examination. We compared the number of features generated by 
our approach against Bayer et al. and Malheur. Table 2 shows the 
relationship between feature space and number of malware 
samples. From Table 2, it is evident that number of features 
generated by Bayer et al. and Malheur grow in proportion with the 
number of malware samples under examination. Whereas, in our 
approach the growth rate of malware feature space is insignificant 
and only 56 features were analyzed. Hence, the experiment result 
shows that our method reduces the malware feature space by 
16,160/56 = 289 and 5,171,871/56 = 92,355 times comparing with 
Bayer et al. and Malheur methods respectively. 
<C:\a.txt: {file_created, file_modified, file_read}>  
<C:\b.txt: {file_read, file_deleted}>  
<C:\c.txt: {file_read, file_deleted}> 
<file_activities> 
<file_created      name = “C:\a.txt”/> 
<file_read      name = “C:\a.txt”/> 
<file_read      name = “C:\b.txt”/> 
<file_read      name = “C:\c.txt”/> 
<file_modified     name = "C:\a.txt”/> 
<file_deleted       name = "C:\b.txt”/> 
<file_deleted       name = "C:\c.txt”/> 
</file_activities> 
{file_created, file_modified, file_read}, 
{file_read, file_deleted} 
 
File feature = 
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Table 1: Preliminary experiment results 
Anti-Virus Vendors 
F-Measure Using Bayer’s results as  base 
Bayer et al. Malheur Ours Improvement by Malheur Improvement by our approach 
F-Secure 0.870 0.891 0.923 2.41 % 6.09 % 
Ikarus 0.882 0.894 0.948 1.36 % 7.48 % 
Symantec 0.874 0.889 0.916 1.72 % 4.81 % 
Kaspersky 0.876 0.893 0.930 1.94 % 6.16 % 
VirusBuster 0.870 0.888 0.926 2.07 % 6.44 % 
In this experiment, our approach has an upper bound of 140 
features. It is also noted that there is no strict upper bound for 
malware feature space as it can vary based on the types of 
sensitive system resources and the corresponding security-critical 
actions considered. Though we have not verified extensively, our 
initial experiment shows that our approach has the advantage of 
predetermining the feature space before clustering process in such 
a way that it doesn’t grow in proportion with number of malwares.  
Table 2: Relationship between malware sample size and 
feature space  
Number of 
malware 
samples 
Feature space 
Bayer et al. Malheur Ours 
500 6,380 18,059 42 
1000 9,007 623,300 47 
1500 11,349 1,561,985 51 
2000 12,797 2,594,645 52 
2652 16,160 5,171,871 56 
5. RELATED WORK 
Apart from scalability of malware feature space, which is 
common to all, there are several other issues in the existing 
malware clustering techniques. Lee et al. [8] proposed a behavior-
based malware classification tool that compares the sequence of 
system calls to determine the similarity between two executables.  
The fine-grained approach makes it difficult to abstract the 
underlying malicious behavior. Hence, restricts it applicability. 
Bailey et al. [7] modeled the malware behavior as non-transient 
state changes. Though, state changes are a higher level abstraction 
than single system calls, this approach fails to identify the 
relationship between two states. Bayer et al. [5] models the 
runtime behavior of a malware using OS objects and operations in 
a fine-grained manner. The system and malware-specific details 
such as file names, registry values, IP addresses and other 
parameters of system operations, introduce unnecessary features 
and increase the amount of noise in the malware features space. 
Rieck et al. [6] proposed Malheur that models the system call 
sequences using n-grams. The malware feature space generated by 
Malheur is very huge and n-gram analysis is not obfuscation-
resilient.   
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have introduced a novel coarse-grained malware 
behavior modeling technique that addresses the scalability 
problem in malware clustering.  Our approach finds an upper 
bound for malware feature space and reduces the amount of noise 
in the extracted features. Furthermore, preliminary experiment 
result shows that our approach improves the clustering accuracy 
by 6.20% while reducing the feature space by 289 times against a 
state-of-the-art malware clustering technique.  
In the future, we have planned to extend this experiment to larger 
dataset and evaluate the scalability of our behavior modeling 
technique in terms of time and space requirements. As malware 
may evolve their behavior from time to time, there could be a 
need to extend the proposed behavioral framework to cover more 
system resources and actions to address the evolution of malware 
behavior. We would like to conduct extensive experiments to 
statistically verify the growth of malware feature space in terms of 
number of malware samples examined. Last but not least, we 
would like to seek feedbacks from peers on the practicality of the 
proposed approach for malware clustering and the possible ways 
to improve it further. 
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